State and Sovereignty. Some reflections on Hermann Heller as interpreter of the Weimar crisis by Lagi, Sara
Sara LAGI 
F-10124 
Università di Torino 
sara.lagi@unito.it 
 
State and sovereignty: Some reflections on Hermann Heller as interpreter 
of the Weimar crisis 
 
Abstract. — ​The present essay addresses the way one of the leading intellectuals of the               
Weimar period – the legal theorist Hermann Heller – analysed and interpreted the roots and               
causes of the Weimar crisis and the weaknesses of that particular system. I will argue that                
such an analysis implied a critical legal and political reflection on the meaning of sovereignty,               
State and democracy. 
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État et souveraineté : quelques réflexions sur Hermann Heller comme interprète de la 
crise de Weimar 
 
Résumé. ​—​ ​Le présent article traite de la façon dont l'un des principaux intellectuels de la               
période de Weimar – le théoricien du droit Hermann Heller – a analysé et interprété les                
origines et les causes de la crise de Weimar et les faiblesses de ce régime particulier. Je                 
montrerai qu'une telle analyse impliquait une réflexion juridique et politique critique sur le             
sens de la souveraineté, de l'État et de la démocratie. 
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The history of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) was characterized by a head-on debate on              
the meaning of constitution, State and sovereignty. Such debate represents a relevant moment             
in the History of European political and juridical thought not only because it involved              
prominent scholars such as Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, Gerahald Leibholz and Hermann            
Heller, but also because it can objectively be considered as an attempt to respond to the                
political and institutional crisis, which caused the collapse of the Weimar Republic .  1
The promulgation of the Weimar constitution was seen as a new start for Germany: the               
Wilhelmine Reich was replaced by a democratic Republic, with a parliamentary government,            
which had to be – according to the intentions of the constituents – counter-balanced by the                
democratic election of the President of the Republic. Also, mainly as a result of the pressure                
made by the Social-democrats within the Constituent Assembly, social rights were           
constitutionalized for the first time. In a few words, as scholars have correctly stressed, the               2
Weimar constitution seemed to be the most progressive ever adopted: it embodied the new era               
of the democratic constitutions, i.e. of those constitutions which were such not only because              
they included universal suffrage but chiefly because they assumed the sovereignty of the             
people, equipped with the constituent power .  3
The principle of Constituent Power, which powerfully erupted for the first time during             
the French Revolution and which in the 19​th century had always evoked the ghost of the                
Revolution and the Giacobin Terror with its radical purposes, re-emerged thanks to the             
Weimar constitution. Yet, the latter contained some controversial aspects, which might have            
negatively influenced the political life of the country and which soon became the object of the                
reflection of some of the leading German intellectuals of that time. In the first instance, the                
co-existence of the principle of the parliamentary government and the direct election of the              
President of the Republic: the democratic investiture of the latter was seen as an effective               
limit to the power of the Parliament, considered as suspect, because of its party pluralism.               
Since the very writing of the Constitution, the idea was that the President had to represent and                 
1 PEUKERT Detlev, ​The Weimar Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity​, Hill and Wang, New York, 1993;                
MOMMSEN Hans, ​The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy​, North Carolina, North Carolina Press, 1996.  
2 GOZZI Gustavo, « Democrazia e pluralismo da Weimar alla Repubblica federale tedesca », in ​Scienza &                
Politica​, n° 6, 1992, p. 85-106. 
3 FIORAVANTI Maurizio, ​La costituzione democratica. Modelli e itinerari del diritto pubblico del ventesimo             
secolo​, Milano, Giuffrè, 2018, p. 84. 
 
 
embody the ultimate unity of the people. It was implicit that such unity ideally had to be                 
juxtaposed to the intrinsic political pluralism and potential divisions within the legislative            
body.  
The Weimar constitution was thus established upon a sort of inner contrast: between             
the President and Parliament, which inevitably assumed two different types of political            
legitimation. Such contrast has been analyzed in numerous and thorough studies and has been              4
interpreted as the « original sin » of the Weimar Constitution, because over the years the               
Parliament and the President became two competing powers. It is however relevant to             
highlight that the idea of the President of the Republic as the bulwark of the unity of the                  
German people revealed the profound mistrust that a large part of the nation had towards the                
legislative body and chiefly the principles of political and party pluralism .  5
The latter were perceived by the conservative sectors of the German society and by              
distinguished political thinkers of that time, such as Carl Schmitt and Heinrich Triepel, as the               
source of dangerous political fragmentation and divisions threatening the unity of the State.             
The growing instability of the Weimar government, the inability of the Parliament to face the               
most urgent social and economic problems of the country seemed to prove the rightness of               
that critique. 
In this respect, it is important to mention Carl Schmitt’s work on the             
Geistgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus ​( ​The Crisis of Parliamentary         
Democracy ​1923), in which he violently attacked parliamentarism and party pluralism, where            
the  creation  and  preservation  of  the  « unitary  will  of  the  State »  was  unfeasible,  in  his 
opinion .  6
Schmitt was proposing a clear-cut political solution: to transform the German Republic            
into a plebiscitary one. He advocated the democratic election of the President of the Republic               
4 On this issue: LOUGHLIN Martin and WALKER Neil (ed.), ​The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent              
Power and Constituent Form ​, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
5 STOLLEIS Michael, ​Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. Dritter Band, Staats - und             
Verwaltungsgeschichte in Republik und Diktatur 1914-1945​, t° 3, München, Verlag C. B. J. Mohr, 1999, p. 153-186;                
WIEGANDT Manfred, ​Die Weimarer Staatsrechtslehre aus dem Blickwinkel des 21. Jahrhunderts ​, in M. Gangl (hrsg.               
von), ​Die Weimarer Staatsrechtsdebatte. Diskurs und Rezeptionsstrategien​, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2011, p. 443;             
BAUME Sandrine, « Rehabilitating Political Parties: an Examinations of the Writings of Hans Kelsen », in ​Intellectual               
History Review​, vol. 28, n° 3; GOZZI Gustavo, « Democrazia e pluralismo da Weimar alla Repubblica federale tedesca                  
», in ​Scienza & Politica​, n° 6, 1992, p. 85-106. 
6 SCHMITT Carl, ​The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy ​(Eng. trans.), ed. KENNEDY Ellen, Massachusetts,             
MIT Press, 1988, p. 84-91. 
 
 
as an antidote against political pluralism and considered the President as the supreme guardian              
of the constitution and as the expression of the people’s constituent power and its political               
unity .  7
There is an extensive literature on how Schmitt’s proposal conflicted with that of Hans              
Kelsen, who lived in Germany in the early 1930s: their dispute about ​Wer soll der Hüter der                 
Verfassung sein? ​( ​Who should be the Guardian of the Constitution? ​) dates back to             
1930-1931. If Schmitt was in favor of a plebiscitary democratic Republic, Kelsen – who was               
his colleague at the University of Cologne – instead supported a true parliamentary             
democracy. If Schmitt assumed the unity of the people as a pre-existing reality which had to                
be embodied (and protected) by the President of the republic, Kelsen believed that such unity               
took shape within the Parliament through a complex game of compromises between the             
political forces, which were plural because – as he stressed – the society and the people                
themselves were plural subjects .  8
Pluralism and unity were thus at the very heart of the Weimar political debate: one of                
its leading characters was Hermann Heller who developed a political and juridical theory on              
the meaning of the State and sovereignty, which aimed at going beyond the head-on              
contraposition between Schimtt and Kelsen.  
Heller: the State and Sovereignty 
In 1927 Heller published a long essay, entitled ​Die Souveränität ( ​Sovereignty ​). He thought             
that the first step towards a systematic solution to the fragility of the Weimar democracy was                
to reflect on the significance of the State and sovereign power. In his opinion, the latter had                 
been misinterpreted over centuries: the State was reduced to an impersonal subject, equipped             
with the sovereign power, which was conceived as similarly impersonal .  9
Since the Modern Age – Heller observed – one of the main intellectual and political               
problems was to understand how to protect the individual from arbitrary power. The solution              
7 Ibid. 
8 KELSEN Hans, ​Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie ​(1920), now in Id., ​Verteidigung der Demokratie​, hrsg.                
von M. Jestaedt und O. Lepsius, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2006; KELSEN Hans, ​Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie                  
(1929), now in Id., ​Verteidigung der Demokratie​, hrsg. von M. Jestaedt und O. Lepsius, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2006.  
9 KELSEN Hans, ​Die Souveränität. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Völkerrechtes ​, in ​Id., ​Gesammelte               
Schriften​, Bd. 3, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1971, p. 39. 
 
 
was, for Heller, to conceptualize more and more the State as a neutral, impersonal body and                
the sovereign power as « the will of the State » deprived of any «subjective components . »  10
To Heller, Hans Kelsen’s legal formalism represented the ultimate and the most            
radical outcome of a century-long process of de-substantialization of the State and            
sovereignty. In his ​Das Problem der Souveränität ​( ​The Problem of Sovereignty ​) ​(1920)            
Kelsen in fact theorized the complete parity between the State and the legal order: the State                
was the legal order and vice versa. Also, sovereignty was defined by the Austrian jurist as the                 
« quality » of the legal order .  11
Assuming that Kelsen’s definition of State and sovereignty as correct, one huge            
problem emerged, for Heller: who decided? Who was the concrete subject of the sovereign              
power ? What kind of relationship existed between the State and society ? Between the State              
and the people ? Kelsen’s legal doctrine was the final symptom of a whole civilization, which               
had lost the ability (and the courage) to see the State and sovereignty in their concrete,                
physical, tangible terms .  12
How to recover such an ability ? Heller thought that it was necessary to look back to                
the past intellectual tradition, and chiefly to two thinkers : Jean Bodin and G. W. Hegel.  
For Heller, the former had the merit of interpreting and defining the State as a               
« unitary entity » which made decisions and implemented them within a territory. It was             
Bodin who – as Heller emphazised – provided us with a similarly consistent definition of               
« sovereign ». The latter was a subject who had to the power to force all citizens to follow and                  
respect his decisions .  13
Heller’s interpretation of Bodin’s work was evidently influenced by Carl Schmitt’s           
lesson on sovereign power as the power of making and imposing political decisions . Yet,              14
such an influence was in some respects mitigated by a similarly strong conviction: Heller              
recognized another crucial merit to Bodin only, i.e. that of identifying « superior principles »,             
10 Ibid​. p. 42-43. 
11 KELSEN Hans, ​Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer Reinen               
Rechtslehre​, Tübingen. Mohr Siebeck, 1920, p. 9-47. 
12 HELLER Hermann, ​Die Souveränität. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Völkerrechtes ​, in ​Id.,              
Gesammelte Schriften​, Bd. 3, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1971, p. 39. 
13 Ibid​. p. 42-45. 
14 On this aspect see: PASQUINO Pasquale, ​Hermann Heller: sovranità e rappresentanza. Introduzione a ​H.              
Heller, ​La sovranità e altri scritti sulla dottrina del diritto e dello Stato​, Milano, Giuffré, 1987, p. 6. 
 
 
which the State itself had to respect. With that, Heller did not want to embrace a                
jus-naturalistic view. He was a legal positivist: in my opinion, he rather wanted to stress how                
Bodin had treated the key problem of limiting State power. 
Faced with Kelsen’s legal formalism, Heller embraced a totally different concept of            
State and sovereignty: he highlighted the absolute centrality of decision, implemented within            
a territory. Yet, his recall to «superior principles» implied a clear refusal of any form of                
absolute sovereignty (legibus soluta). Hegel was a source of inspiration for Heller too. In a               
long essay published in 1921, entitled ​Hegel und der nationale Machstaatsgedanke in            
Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zur politischen Geistesgeschichte ( ​Hegel and the Problem of State            
in Germany​) Heller depicted Hegel as the one who had been able to break with liberal and                 
century long tradition of contractualism, according to which the State had to be seen as the                
result of a contract subscribed by single individuals who, on the basis of a rational ​calculus ​,                
left the « state of nature » and established a government .  15
With his work, Hegel went beyond this individualistic foundation of the State, by             
developing an « organic » concept of the State, according to which the State did not derive               
from single individuals, while admitting the existence of plurality . 16
Bodin thus provided Heller with the idea that the State was a physical entity,              
connected with the territorial dimension, and exercising the sovereign power which was the             
power of making binding decisions for the people.  
Hegel then provided Heller with another important conceptual tool: the idea that the             
State was something higher and more complex than the mere result of a contract and thus                
something more than an entity established to accomplish the (individualistic) needs and            
purposes of an (individualistic) society. Yet, as previously seen, the critique of contractualism             
did not imply the refusal of pluralism (social, ideal and political).  
In the Weimar period, Heller thought that the main task of an intellectual was to go                
beyond any desubstantialized concept of the State and sovereignty, because it was vital and              
15 HELLER Hermann, ​Hegel und der nationale Machstaatsgedanke in Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zur politischen             
Geistesgeschichte ​(1921), now in Id., ​Gesammelte Schriften​, hrsg. Von C. Müller, M. Draht, O. Stammer und G.                 
Niemeyer, Tübngen, Mohr Siebeck, 1992, p. 21-240.  
16 Ibid​. p. 135-140. 
 
 
necessary, for him, to reflect on the meaning of a concrete form of State, the democratic one,                 
which was that established in Germany and which was going through a serious crisis. 
What did a democratic State mean ? How did it work ? And most importantly how was               
it possible to reconcile political unity and social plurality ? Staring from the presupposition             
that sovereignty meant making decisions, how could the people (the sovereign subject within             
a democratic State) make their political decisions? Finding a credible answer to such a              
question, for Heller meant defining a solution to the Weimar crisis, which was the crisis of a                 
democratic State and community. 
For Heller, the specific form of people’s sovereignty was ​political representation: ​It            
was solely through the latter that « people as a unity » could rule over « the people as a                 
plurality » . The mechanism of political representation explained, for Heller, how concretely           17
the people ruled within a democratic State but it did not explain what made that « ruling »                
legitimate. Even if his concept of political representation as the form of the people’s              
sovereignty re-echoed Thomas Hobbes , Heller seemed to take inspiration from Jean-Jacques           18
Rousseau when he affirmed that the « link » between the representative and the represented,             
between the rulers and ruled was politically legitimated by the concrete and actual existence              
of a “general will”  ( ​volonté générale ​). 19
If that « general will » didn’t actually exist the mechanism of political representation            
lost its most profound political sense. In other words, without the « general will » the              
democratic rule of the people through political representation was ​legal ​but not ​legitimate ​. For              
Heller, the discrepancy between « legality and legitimacy » was the core of the Weimar crisis.              
Such a discrepancy was partially imputable to that process of de-substantialization of State             
and sovereignty, which had put the problem of sovereign power as the power of making               
decisions aside. In this way, for Heller, sovereignty had changed into an impersonal power:              
the main focus thus became the legality of the power rather that its legitimacy, i.e. the main                 
17 HELLER Hermann, ​Die Souveränität. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Völkerrechtes ​, in ​Id.,              
Gesammelte Schriften​, t° 3, cit., p. 68. 
18 Pasquale Pasquino stresses how Heller adopted Hobbes’ view of representation as a form of sovereignty.               
PASQUINO Pasquale, ​Hermann Heller..., op. cit., ​p. 6. 
19 HELLER Hermann, ​Die Souveränität..., op. cit., ​p. 70-71. 
 
 
focus had moved from ​who made decisions and ​what ​was decided to ​how such decisions are                
made .  20
Faced with the Weimar crisis, the main challenge was to reflect on the State and               
sovereignty in concrete terms, by understanding who decided within a democratic State and             
what conditions made such decisions democratically legitimate. For Heller, the answer was –             
as previously stated – the concept of the « volonté générale ».  
Yet, once it was identified, Heller raised two more questions: how did the « volonté              
générale » take shape ? And how could it be combined with the preservation of social, ideal               
and political pluralism which, for him, was an essential condition to the existence of a modern                
democracy, including the granting of fundamental rights to everyone ? In 1928, he published             
what I personally think is his major contribution to 20​th century political theory, ​Politische              
Demokratie und Soziale Ömogenität TRADURRE This was an essay characterized by a            
profound social-democratic idealism but we would make a mistake if we considered it as a               
mere expression of ideological motivations. Heller argued that “the general will” making the             
people’s rule legitimate could exist only on one precise condition, that is only if a true « social                 
homogeneity » existed and worked. By «social homogeneity» Heller meant a consciousness           
of the « we », without which no true democratic State could survive and no political unity               
could survive either. He thought that the creation of social homogeneity concretely implied             
the integration of the working class – and not only the upper one – into the body State, into                   
the political life of the State .  21
Only on this condition could laws issued by the parliament be considered the true              
expression of the people’s sovereignty rather than the expression of an elite imposing its will               
unilaterally on the rest of society. The crucial political and stringent problem of the Weimar               
democratic Republic, Heller argued, was that no effective social homogeneity had ever            
existed. Social homogeneity did not imply the elimination of pluralism, more the ability to              
make it co-exist with the necessary political unity .  22
20 On the issue of legality versus legitimacy within Heller’s reflection see: fundamental DYZENHAUS David,              
Legality and Legitimacy. Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar ​, Oxford, Oxford University Press,                
2003. 
21 HELLER Hermann, ​Politische Demokratie und Soziale Ömogenität​, ​in ​Id​., ​Gesammelte Schriften​, t° 2, cit., p.               
426-427. 
22 Ibid​. p. 427. 
 
 
In this way, Heller was developing a political reflection on the State and sovereignty              
(democratic), which aimed at going beyond both Schmitt and Kelsen. He refused Schmitt’s             
concept of political unity as neutralization of a supposedly dangerous pluralism just as he              
refused Kelsen’s legal formalism, with its rejection of the decisional dimension of            
sovereignty.  
Heller argued that once the more concrete meaning of State and sovereignty had been              
recovered, one should understand how both worked in democratic terms. For him, this             
implied to recognize that a democratic State was such because it was based on the principle of                 
the people as true sovereign, making binding decisions within a territory. At the same time,               
Heller was far from being tempted to identify the people with a unitary entity, in which there                 
was no room for diversity and plurality. He praised pluralism as a positive factor, for example                
party pluralism. In this sense, he was close to Kelsen’s position .  23
Yet, looking at the Weimar crisis and the political fragmentation paralyzing the            
Parliament, he stressed the necessity of a true « social homogeneity ». As a Social-democrat,             
he thought that a large part of the Weimar crisis derived from the deliberate exclusion of the                 
working class from political life. The ​bourgeoise was responsible for that . If the latter did               24
not realize the vital importance of integrating the working class into the body State, the               
working class would be more and more radicalized, losing its trust and loyalty towards              
democratic institutions and embracing the ideal of a violent revolution. In fact, the 1920s were               
typified by a growing radicalization which regarded both Extreme Right and the Extreme             
Left .  25
Heller was very far from those advocating a Bolshevik Revolution in Europe. He was              
critical toward the concept of « proletarian dictatorship ». He firmly believed not only in the              
preservation of pluralism but also in the protection of fundamental rights and liberties, even              
though he remained critical toward capitalism.   26
23 Id​. 
24 Kelsen was always supportive of pluralism and party pluralism. See: VAN OOYEN Robert Christian, ​Der               
Staat der Moderne: Hans Kelsens Pluralismustheorie​. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2003. 
25 MASTELLONE Salvo, Storia della democrazia in Europa. Da Montesquieu a Kelsen​, Torino, UTET, 1993;              
BARTH Boris, ​Europa nach dem grossen Krieg: die Krise der Demokratie in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918-1938​,               
Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2016. 
26 LLANQUE Marcus, « Hermann Heller and the Republicanism of the Left in the Weimar Republic », in ​Jus 
Politicum. Revue de droit politique​, 23, 2019, p. 18-30. 
 
 
The point was to go beyond a formal, legalist concept of democracy, i.e. beyond the               
idea that once a parliament elected by all citizens had been established, democracy was              
carried out perfectly. The latter could exist and work if social homogeneity was accomplished,              
if the working class was politically integrated. In order to reach such an ambitious goal, Heller                
proposed to enact social reforms in favor of the working class itself and implement the social                
rights of the Constitution . 27
Heller’s reflection on the meaning of State and sovereignty was his personal response             
to the Weimar crisis - a response emphasizing the necessity to find a durable compromise               




27 DYZENHAUS David, « Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: A Contemporary Lesson ? », in ​The American                   
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